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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
Intrusion detection systems have become a key component in ensuring the safety of systems and networks. 
As networks grow in size and speed continues to increase, it is crucial that efficient scalable techniques 
should be developed for IDS systems. Signature based detection is the most extensively used threat 
detection technique for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). One of the foremost challenges for signature-
based IDS systems is how to keep up with large volume of incoming traffic when each packet needs to be 
compared with every signature in the database. When an IDS cannot keep up with the traffic flood, all it 
can do is to drop packets, therefore, may miss potential attacks. This paper proposes a new model called 
Dynamic Multi-Layer Signature based IDS using Mobile Agents, which can detect imminent threats with 
very high success rate by dynamically and automatically creating and using small and efficient multiple 
databases, and at the same time, provide mechanism to update these small signature databases at regular 
intervals using Mobile Agents. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The current internet faces escalating threats form more sophisticated, intelligent and automated 
malicious codes. In the past, we have seen computer worms spread themselves without any 
human interaction and launched the most destructive attacks against computer networks. As an 
example, in January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm, also known as sapphire, was released into the 
internet exploiting a weakness into Microsoft SQL servers. In only 10 minutes the worm spread 
worldwide consuming massive amount of bandwidth and bringing down 5 of the 13 root DNS 
servers. 
Amongst worms defensive mechanisms, Intrusion Detection systems (IDS) are the most widely 
deployed techniques that utilize the self-duplicating repetitive nature of computer worms to detect 
the patterns and signatures of theses malicious codes in the network traffic. These systems based 
on the parameters used for detection, can be broadly divided to signature based and anomaly 
based systems. 
1.2 Signature-based IDS 
 
Signature-based detection is normally used for detecting known attacks. There are different 
definitions of attack signatures. In this paper, the main discussion will focus on content 
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signatures, which represent a string of characters that appear in the payload of attack packets. No 
knowledge of normal traffic is required but a signature database is needed for this type of 
detection systems. For worm detection, this type of system does not care how a worm finds the 
target, how it propagates itself or what transmission scheme it uses. The system takes a look at 
the payload and identify whether or not it contain a worm. 
One big challenge of signature-based IDS is that every signature requires an entry in the database, 
and so a complete database might contain hundreds or even thousands of entries. Each packet is 
to be compared with all the entries in the database. This can be very resource- consuming and 
doing so will slow down the throughput and making the IDS vulnerable to DoS attacks. Some of 
the IDS evasion tools use this vulnerability and flood the signature signature-based IDS systems 
with too many packets to the point that the IDS cannot keep up with the traffic, thus making the 
IDS time out and drop packets and as a result, possibly miss attacks [1]. Further, this type of IDS 
is still vulnerable against unknown attacks as it relies on the signatures currently in the database 
to detect attacks. 
1.2 Anomaly-based IDS 
The signature of a new attack is not known before it is detected and carefully analyzed. So it is 
difficult to draw conclusions based on a small number of packets. In this case, anomaly-based 
systems detect abnormal behaviors and generate alarms based on the abnormal patterns in 
network traffic or application behaviors. Typical  anomalous  behaviors  that  may  be captured  
include 1)  misuse of  network  protocols  such  as overlapped IP fragments and running a 
standard protocol on a stealthy port; 2) uncharacteristic traffic patterns, such as  more UDP 
packets compared  to  TCP  ones, and  3) suspicious patterns in application payload. 
The big challenges of anomaly based   detection systems are defining what a normal network 
behavior is, deciding the threshold to trigger the alarm, and preventing false alarms. The  users  of  
the  network  are  normally human,  and  people  are  hard  to  predict.    If the normal model is 
not defined carefully, there will be lots of false alarms and the detection system will suffer from 
degraded performance. 
 
2. PROPOSED WORK 
 
From the above discussions and analysis, it becomes very much obvious that anomaly-based IDS 
have huge risk in generating high false positives, while in contrast, signature-based IDS are less 
susceptible to generate false alarms because the decision to generate an alarm is based on the 
signatures detected and does not require any knowledge of the normal traffic. However, 
signature-based IDS have their own limitations. 
1.  Every signature requires an entry in the database, and each packet needs to be compared with 
all the entries in the database. This may potentially slow down the throughput of the systems. 
2.  Signature-based IDS is vulnerable against newly emerging attacks.  
For the second issue, there are already proposals and systems such as [6] that use a 
complementary payload-based anomaly detection system to detect new attacks, create signatures, 
and provide the new signatures to the signature-based IDS for the detection of the new threats. 
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Our focus in this paper will be addressing the first limitation of the signature-based IDS. In this 
paper, we proposed a new dynamic Multi-layer model for signature-based IDS with Mobile 
Agents. Our proposed model consists of multiple IDS systems deployed in different layers, and 
each is contained with small signature database. There is also a large complementary signature 
database containing all the entries of signatures detected during training period. We present a 
simple and automatic way to decide the set of rules and signatures to be deployed in the different 
IDS and continuously update the rules based on the usage pattern.  Mobile Agents are used to 
perform the updating process of small signature databases. Using this model, we expect to 
optimize the detection rate of frequent threats to the network as well as providing means to detect 
uncommon attacks to the network. 
 
3. RELATED WORK IN ADDRESSING LIMITATIONS OF 
SIGNATURE-BASED IDS 
 
Signature based IDS systems require that their data bases need to be updated regularly at different 
time intervals so as to detect the imminent threads generated on the network. This process is a 
quite time consuming and requires a quick underlying system to update the database. Two layer 
signature based model was proposed to address signature based detections with unequal 
databases. But this model doesn’t have any mechanism for adding, removing or updating 
signatures in the large signature based database [7]. If the signature database is not updated 
timely, then new threats will not be detected using this model.   
P. Wheeler [8], in his thesis, divides all efforts to address this issue in the following categories: 
1.  Improving content matching algorithms- signature matching is one of the most 
computationally intensive tasks of IDS. Methods such as Landmark Segment Method (LSM) [9] 
and modified Aho-Corasick algorithm [10] have been proposed to reduce the execution time of 
signature matching. 
2. Parallel processing – parallelism can be achieved at different  levels:  a)  at  node  level  by  
running  a subset of rules on different nodes to keep the database size small; b) at  component 
level by running different  components of the IDS, such   as   preprocessors   and   rules   engine,  
on different nodes to  distribute the load;  and c) at sub-component  level by dividing a particular 
component of the IDS into n parallel instances, with each instance responsible for 1/n of the 
incoming packets. 
While all the above efforts are geared toward improving the IDS throughput, they either require 
significant modifications to existing IDS by including new content matching algorithms, or 
require dedicated hardware resources to achieve acceleration, or need to coordinate tasks and 
aggregate   output from parallel processing units. The proposed model is very simple, less 
resource demanding, yet can be used in combination with the above schemes. This model updated 
large complementary signature based database regularly in different time intervals using mobile 
agents. These mobile agents automatically add, remove and update large signature database 
without consuming time and resources. Hence proposed model doesn’t add any additional 
overhead over the system performance and cost.   
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4. DYNAMIC MULTI-LAYER SIGNATURE-BASED IDS USING 
MOBILE AGENTS 
The work proposed in this paper is motivated by the fact that it is easy and less time consuming to 
update small signature databases compare to large complementary signature database 
continuously from time to time. By doing this we can also improve the throughput of signature-
based IDS, since a packet needs to be matched with less number of signatures in small signature 
database compare to one with huge number of signatures. This idea is not new, and in fact, it has  
been  suggested  by  an  installation  note  to  system administrators  of  Snort [11]. To turn this 
idea into an effective one, we need to address three major issues. 
1. How to decide whether a given signature is likely to be helpful for possible attacks? We need 
systematic guidelines whether to remove a given signature. Currently, configuring the signature 
database is still a manual trial and error process of disabling some signatures and adding them 
back in after missing some attacks. 
2. What to do if we make the wrong choice and classify a useful signature as unlikely and 
remove it from the database? How to protect the network in this case? 
3. What to do once a new service or protocol is added to the network? We cannot completely 
rely on the administrators to    remember to manually add the corresponding signatures to the 
database. This process is labor-intensive and can be error prone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                   Figure1. Dynamic Multi layer signature based IDS using Mobile Agents 
This paper addresses all of the above issues by proposing a new model based on small signature 
databases called Dynamic Multi Layer model. The proposed model consists of multiple smaller 
databases containing the most frequent attack signatures on the IDS, and a bigger complementary 
signature database containing thousands of signatures used to update smaller databases from time 
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to time using mobile agents. By distributing the signature database between multiple nodes, it is 
important to consider two main aspects of the proposed model. 1) The signature database size on 
the nodes should not always be equal; it depends on the algorithm to update the small signature 
databases and also to keep the database size varying all the time. 2) The size of the databases on 
nodes dynamically changes to optimize the detection rate on more likely imminent threats. 
The Implementation of proposed model comprises of two main phases: 
1. Training Period: during the training period the system gathers information about the current 
threats to the network.  
 
2. Running Phase: during this phase the signature databases are updated based on their usage 
patterns. 
The duration of the training period depends on the network conditions and can vary from few 
hours to several days. The longer the training period, it is more likely to have a better baseline of 
the most frequent attacks on the network. 
Once the training period is done, we look at the alert logs in the database. Depending on the 
criteria  and parameters that can be defined by the user, we identify the most frequent attacks 
based on the 1) minimum number of occurrences of a signature, 2) the age of the alert in the 
database, 3) and the maximum number of signatures that we would like to keep in the all the IDS. 
After identifying the most frequent attacks, we create a signature database for all IDS containing 
signatures for the most frequent attacks and create a complementary signature database 
containing the remaining signatures recognizable by the system. After the initial training period, 
Mobile Agents are used to update the small signature   database if some new signature is updated 
in large complimentary database. This work is done periodically at certain time intervals defined 
in the implementation of mobile agents. 
It is very much important to emphasize here that the proposed model will not miss attacks 
frequently as compare to the previous models proposed. This is because small signature databases 
are updated constantly with most updated and latest signatures using mobile agents. The 
complementary IDS help to detect less frequent attacks that may arise by comparing the 
signatures with packets travelling on the network. 
5. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
For prototype implementation, we chose Snort [11] as our signature-based IDS platform. We 
configured Snort’s output plug-ins to log the alerts in the MySQL database for easy access and 
queries. Snort stores its signatures in rule files referenced in the Snort’s configuration file. 
Further, we developed a simple algorithm using mobile agents as an engine to create the   most 
frequent signature databases for the multiple IDS as well as generating the complementary 
signature database for the secondary IDS. The same algorithm runs on all IDS systems for certain 
intervals to keep the primary signature database constantly updated. This can be done by 
removing signatures that are no longer occurring frequently, and also adding any signature 
detected as a frequent alert by the secondary IDS. The pseudo code for our program is presented 
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in Figure 2 below.  The algorithm accepts three input    parameters: MinFreq specifying the 
minimum number of attack occurrences to be considered as frequent, ValidTime setting the time 
beyond which the attacks seen are considered as valid and threatening, and MaxNum representing   
the maximum number of the signatures acceptable in all IDS. 
 
1. N = 0   # number of current signatures 
2. Query the MySQL database to retrieve 
            the set of signatures detected, S. 
3.         for every signature f in S do 
4. Freq = number of occurrences of f 
5. LTime = last detection time of f 
6. if N <= MaxNum and Freq >= MinFreq and Ltime >= ValidTime then 
7. remove the signature from the secondary database 
8. add the signature in multiple IDS 
9. N = N+1 
10. endif 
11.   endfor 
12.   restart multiple and complimentary  IDS 
Figure 2 Algorithm to generate and update signature databases 
6. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
This section of the paper describes and discusses in detail the experimental setup made for 
performing experiments and then and analyze the results generated after performing different 
experiments at different time intervals with different parameters.  
6.1 Experimental Setup 
The experiments were performed choosing two different hardware platforms to simulate attacks 
and run IDS, one more powerful than the other. The objective was to simulate DoS attacks on 
IDS systems by running IDS on the slower machine and attacking tools on the faster machine. 
The aggregate computational and networking resources of attackers usually overwhelm the 
resources on the IDS machine. In this case, we would like to evaluate the effects of having 
multiple smaller   signature databases and how effectively it helps in improving the throughput 
and decreasing   packet loss rate. A small packet loss rate directly leads to small possibility to 
miss real attacks that might be hidden in false positive storms.  
The detailed hardware and software configurations of systems used for performing 
experiments are as follows. 
Attacking System: 
 512MB memory / Windows XP  
 CPU: AMD Geode NX running at 1.4GHz 
 10/100Mbps NIC 
  
IDS System: 
 256MB memory / Windows XP 
 CPU: Pentium III running at 500 MHz 
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 10 Mbps NIC 
 
 
Table 1 Signatures Detected during Training Period 
 
Signature Name Number of 
Occurrences 
(spp_frag2) TTL Limit Exceeded (reassemble) detection  
2 
(portscan) UDP Portscan 3 
ICMP Destination Unreachable Communication 3 
Administratively Prohibited 3 
(spp_frag2) Teardrop attack 4 
MISC gopher proxy 4 
(portscan) TCP Portscan 5 
WEB-MISC Compaq Insight directory traversal 11 
DDOS tfn2k icmp possible communication 14 
ICMP Large ICMP Packet 14 
WEB-CGI search.cgi access 17 
WEB-MISC http directory traversal 18 
TELNET SGI telnetd format bug 19 
(http_inspect) DOUBLE DECODING ATTACK 20 
FINGER query 21 
BACKDOOR Q access 26 
BACKDOOR SIGNATURE - Q ICMP 28 
DDOS mstream client to handler 29 
BAD-TRAFFIC udp port 0 traffic 35 
SNMP request udp 40 
DOS arkiea backup 48 
(http_inspect) WEBROOT DIRECTORY TRAVERSAL 49 
BAD-TRAFFIC tcp port 0 traffic 84 
(http_inspect) OVERSIZE REQUEST-URI DIRECTORY 96 
NETBIOS RFParalyze Attempt 105 
(spp_rpc_decode) Incomplete RPC segment 129 
FTP command overflow attempt 163 
WEB-CGI Allaire Pro Web Shell attempt 981 
WEB-CGI Armada Style Master Index directory traversal 998 
WEB-IIS index server file source code attempt 1525 
BAD-TRAFFIC same SRC/DST 1754 
ICMP Echo Reply 3409 
BAD-TRAFFIC loopback traffic 21886 
(snort_decoder): Invalid UDP header, length field <86006 
 
6.2 Attacking Tools 
During the training period, following tools were used IDSwakeup [12], Stick [13], Sneeze [14], 
and Nikto [15], to trigger alerts by the IDS system and create a baseline of the most frequent 
attacks on our network. Here we briefly describe each tool. 
International Journal of  Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.2, No.4, October 2010 
 
136 
 
IDSwakeup is designed to test the functionality of the IDS by generating some common attack 
signatures to trigger IDS alarms. 
Stick is another tool fed with Snort configuration files to reverse engineer threats  and create 
packets with signatures in the same way as those detected by Snort as attacks. Stick can be used 
to test the functionality of IDS as well as be deployed as a stress tester. It can be also used as an 
IDS evasion tool by generating a lot of traffic, and camouflaging the real attacks in a flood of 
false positives.  
Sneeze is a Perl-based tool that is very similar to Stick in terms of functionalities. It distinguishes 
itself from Stick by the fact that it can accept Snort’s rules at runtime and dynamically generate 
attack packets, whereas Stick needs to be configured with Snort’s rules   at compilation time. 
Nikto focuses on web application attacks by scanning and testing web servers and their associated 
CGI scripts for thousands of potential vulnerabilities. 
6.3 Analysis of Results 
The results of the signatures detected during the training period are shown in Table 1. 
For performing experiment, we set the value of MinFreq to 1, i.e., we considered any attack that 
appeared at least once as a frequent attack. In addition, we set ValidTime to be a negative number 
so that all the threats detected in the training period are to be included in the database. Our 
program scanned all the rule files of  Snort and created a new rule file called  “signature.rule” 
containing the most frequently signatures detected during the training period  to be referenced by 
the snort.conf file as the only signature rule file. In addition, our program created complementary 
rule files taking out the most frequently used signatures for the secondary IDS system. 
Snort was restarted on both systems pointing to the new signature files. 
To test the performance of all IDS, we conducted our experiment in two different scenarios. In 
the first scenario, we manually enabled 3211 signatures and attacked the   network using Sneeze 
[14]. 
In the second scenario, we let our program do its job by enabling only the most frequent 
signatures (in this case 33) as shows in  Table 2 which shows the results of our tests  in regards   
of the effects on packet drop rate (throughput). 
Our test results clearly show the difference in the performance of the IDS using small signature 
database comparing to just enabling all signatures. In our environment with our specific 
configuration, by reducing the size of the database almost 97 times (3211/33), on average, we 
were able to decrease the percentage of the dropped packets by 6.77 times. This is a major 
improvement reducing the possibility of a real worm attack sneaking in the midst of dropped 
packets by the IDS system while ensuring all imminent threats can be detected by the IDS 
system. 
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Performanec Measurements
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Table 2: Performance Measurements (Test 1) 
 
 
Figure 3: Performance Measurement (Test 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Performance Measurements (Test 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST 2 
Packets received 182688 
 
193890 
 
Packets analyzed 182688 
 
190581 
 
Packets dropped by 
Snort 
15155 
 
3309 
Percentage of packets 
dropped 
8.296% 
 
1.707% 
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Figure 4: Performance Measurement (Test 2) 
Table 4: Performance Measurements (Test 3) 
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Figure 5: Performance Measurement (Test 2) 
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we introduced a new model of dynamic Multi-layer signature-based IDS using 
Mobile Agents to ensure that all the threats to the network are detected without compromising the 
performance. Our experiments proved a significant decrease in the packet drop rate, and as a 
result, a significant improvement in detecting threats to the network. Further, our proposed 
system can be improved by providing a more comprehensive and automated system that can 
distribute, add and remove the signatures across databases of multiple IDS systems based on the 
frequency of their appearance and their level of threat to the network. Finally, we believe more 
research needs to be done to determine the criteria to choose the optimal training period for a 
network. 
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